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Abstract 
The gains from openness to trade and multinational production (MP) depend largely on country size. 
A large country may attract more foreign firms by closing itself to trade, while a small country may 
attract a larger amount of MP if trade costs with its neighbors are low because it can be used as an 
export platform. I develop a model to study these effects, where firms face non-convex decisions of 
whether to serve a foreign country by exporting from the home country, exporting from a third 
country, or producing in the foreign country. I calibrate the model separately for South America and 
Europe. I find that the gains from openness in Europe are double those in South America, and that the 
distribution of these gains varies less with size in South America. I also find that MP is more 
important in explaining the gains from openness in large countries, but the export platform mechanism 
is more important in small countries. Finally, I find that trade and MP have important implications for 
the size distribution of firms. 
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1 Introduction
The gains from openness to trade and multinational production (MP) depend largely
on country size. A large country may attract more foreign firms by closing itself to
trade, while a small country may attract a larger amount of MP if trade costs with its
neighbors are low because it can be used as an export platform. I develop a quantitative
theory to assess how trade barriers and country size interact to determine the location
of multinational firms, and its effects on GDP, GNP, and firm size distribution.
Trade barriers affect the location decision of multinational firms in two ways. First,
trade barriers change the relative cost of exporting compared to producing in the con-
sumption location. A firm may decide to become multinational if it is cheaper to serve
a market by MP rather than by exporting. Second, trade barriers change the relative
cost of exporting from two different locations. Firms may use a country as an export
platform to serve a set of neighbor countries.1 The importance of these two channels
depends critically on country size. For a small country it is difficult to attract multina-
tional production to overcome trade barriers since its domestic market is small. Then,
for a small country the way of attracting multinational firms is by offering the possibility
of serving other countries, i.e. to be used as an export platform. On the other hand,
large countries, as they have large markets, can attract MP even with high trade costs
(they may attract even a larger amount of MP with trade barriers than without).
I quantitatively compare the performance of large and small countries in two different
regions: South America, with high trade barriers; and Europe, with low trade barriers. In
order to do so, I use a heterogeneous firm model of trade with monopolistic competition,
asymmetric countries, and allowing for MP and bridge multinational production (BMP).
I perform two separate calibrations, one for each region. In the calibration for South
America, I include Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. In the calibration for Europe,
I include four members of the European Union (France, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom). In both cases I include a fifth country which stands for the rest of the
world. To calibrate the model I use data on bilateral trade flows, bilateral FDI flows,
firm composition (domestic and foreign, exporters and non-exporters), GDP per capita,
manufacturing trade deficit, and labor force size.
To assess the gains from openness I compare the real GDP in the calibrated model
economies with the real GDP in autarky. I find that the gains from openness in Europe
double those in South America (10.5% versus 5.3% of real GDP), indicating that, as a
region, South America is closed, benefitting little from trade and MP. Then, I perform
three experiments to disentangle the contribution of the different channels through which
1I call this mechanism bridge multinational production following Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013).
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MP affects the gains from openness: (i) by producing and selling in the domestic country
(MP itself); (ii) by using the domestic country as an export platform (BMP); and (iii)
both effects together. To asses the contribution of MP itself (without considering the
BMP channel), I compare the losses of going to autarky in a world with MP and no
BMP versus a world without MP (this implies no BMP neither). I find that MP itself
plays a bigger role in large countries. In the Netherlands the losses of going to autarky
in a world without BMP are 20% larger than in a world without MP, while in Italy they
are 84% larger. This means that for the Netherlands most of the gains from MP come
from BMP while in Italy most of the gains come from MP itself (not from BMP). To
assess the role played by BMP, in the second experiment I compare the losses of going
to autarky in the calibrated model economies with the losses in a world in which BMP is
not allowed. I find that BMP is more important for small countries. For example, in the
Netherlands the losses of going to autarky are 20% higher in the baseline economy than
in the world without BMP, while in Italy they are only 10% higher. Finally, to assess
the contribution of MP (including both mechanisms), I compare the losses of going to
autarky in the calibrated model economies with the losses of going to autarky in a world
without MP. I find that MP as a whole is more important for large countries. The losses
of going to autarky in Italy are 100% larger than in a world without MP, while in the
Netherlands they are only 44% larger. It is worth mentioning that in South America,
since economies are more closed (reducing the possibility of exploiting BMP) and foreign
firms are much less efficient (reducing the gains from MP itself)2, the role played by MP
and BMP in explaining the gains from openness in large and small countries is changed.
Uruguay (the small country) benefits more from BMP than Brazil, but MP itself is
equally important in both countries.
My second set of findings is that the differences between what a small and what a big
country lose when going to autarky are very different among regions. In South America,
losses are more homogeneously distributed (vary less with size) than in Europe. The
difference between what Brazil (the largest country) loses in real manufacturing GDP
and what Uruguay (the smallest country) loses is of 8.5 percentage points, while in
Europe this difference is of 14.7 percentage points. The higher heterogeneity in Europe
comes from the fact that Europe is more open than South America, which allows a small
country in Europe, like the Netherlands, to take more advantage from trade and MP
than a small country in South America, like Uruguay.
Next, I study what would be the gains in South America of improving the degree
2Even though I do not explicitly model this aspect, the low efficiency of multinationals (high γ in the
model) may be due to institutions, labor market policies, input quality, etc.
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of openness. South America is a much more closed region and there could be large
gains from openness. To do this, I decrease the variable trade cost in all countries in
the calibration for South America setting them to the average level in Europe.3 I find
that all countries benefit from this reduction, but the smallest country, Uruguay, is the
one that benefits the most with an increase in manufacturing real GDP of 30%. If,
in addition, the efficiency of multinational firms operating in these countries increases
20%, the gains would increase from 30% to 50%. The gains for Uruguay would be
even larger if the improvement in efficiency takes place only in Uruguay but not in the
other South American countries. This is because in this case Uruguay would face less
competition to attract multinational firms. However BMP is crucial to attain the gains
from better efficiency. If I do not allow for BMP, the additional gains Uruguay would
get by improving efficiency (on top of the ones obtained by reducing trade costs) are
close to zero.
Finally, I study how openness affects the size distribution of businesses across coun-
tries and regions. In the calibrated model economies, the size distribution of firms
changes across countries of different size in the same region, and also across countries of
the same size in different regions. I find that openness increases the proportion of large
firms (with more than 250 employees) more in small than in large countries, and also
that this effect is larger in the open than in the closed regions. In the baseline economy,
the Netherlands has 4.2% of large firms while Uruguay has 1.1%, Italy has 1.7% and
Brazil has 0.8%. Therefore, internationalization of firms has an important effect on the
size distribution of firms. This is, I believe, an important contribution to the misallo-
cation literature on business size distribution. Previous papers have studied the effects
of size dependent policies (Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Garc´ıa-
Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012)), capital market imperfections (Erosa (2001), Amaral
and Quintin (2010), Buera et al. (2011), Greenwood et al. (2010)) and trade (Melitz
(2003), Piguillem and Rubini (2012)) on firm size distribution. My paper contributes to
this literature by addressing the effect that trade and MP have on the size of businesses.
Previous studies have analyzed the interaction of trade and MP but these studies
did not allow for BMP.4 Recently, some papers have incorporated BMP in their models.
Ekholm et al. (2007), developed a model of trade with three countries to study the role
3I understand that in the trade barriers I use in the model, I include features like geography or language
which vary a lot between regions and are probably not subject to reductions. Still using Europe as the best
scenario that South America can reach is a very informative exercise on the size of the gains that could be
obtained.
4See Helpman (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (2000), Irarrazabal et al.
(2013). Helpman et al. (2004) do not include BMP in the main text, but they developed it in the appendix.
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of the export platform, however they do not allow for firm heterogeneity. Ramondo and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) use a ricardian model of trade to address the gains from openness
(trade and MP). However, they cannot address the effects of country size on the location
of multinational firms since they assume perfect competition and as a result they do not
model fixed costs of MP. Arkolakis et al. (2013) model trade and MP with monopolistic
competition. However, they do not include fixed costs of setting up foreign firms. Fixed
costs are important to study the role that the size of a country plays in determining
the location of multinationals, which is the goal of my paper. With fixed costs there
are increasing returns in production, which makes the size of a market an important
variable to make a location decision. The closest paper to mine is Tintelnot (2012). He
includes fixed cost of producing and performing MP and studies the gains from openness
(trade and MP) in a monopolistic competition set-up. The focus in my theory is on how
BMP shapes the impact of country size and geography (the distribution of trade costs
across different countries) on the determination of output and trade across countries. In
particular, I use my theory to quantitatively assess and compare the geography of trade
and multinational production barriers in South America versus Europe. Finally, I also
assess the effects of trade, MP and BMP on the distribution of firm sizes.
2 Facts
In this section I document some facts on the relation between trade, FDI and country
size for South America and Europe. I use data from the World Bank to measure trade
and FDI flows, and data from the United Nations to measure FDI stock.5 In order to
study the relation between trade, FDI and country size I run the following regression:
yit = β0 + β1 ∗ Populationit + β2 ∗Mercosuri + β3 ∗Mercosuri ∗ Populationit
+ β4 ∗ European Unioni + β5 ∗ European Unioni ∗ Populationit +
∑
t
γt ∗ yeart(1)
where yit is the outcome of interest (either Trade/GDP or FDI/GDP ); yeart are year
fixed effects; Mercosur is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the country belongs
to the MERCOSUR;6 Population is the natural logarithm of total population (when
using from the WDI) or the labor force (in the case of UNCTAD data); Europe is also a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country entered in the European Union
5The data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistics years
1995-2013, and The World Bank Development Indicators from 1990-2013.
6The four countries that originally signed the MERCOSUR agreement in 1991 are Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay.
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before 2000.7 Finally, I include the interaction of the two regional dummies and the
population variable.
Table 1 presents the results of running equation 1 on two different samples using
Trade/GDP as outcome variable. Column 1 presents the results using the whole set
of countries in the WDI sample, while column 2 excludes countries with less than 100
thousand inhabitants.8 It is a well-known fact in the trade literature that small countries
benefit the most from trade. As a result it is expected to observe that small countries
are more open than large countries (which should be reflected in negative β1, β3 and
β5). As expected β1 has a negative sign and it is significant. Looking at the coefficients
for MERCOSUR and Europe fixed effects (β2 and β4 respectively) we observe that both
are positive, which means that countries in these regions have a higher Trade/GDP
than the rest of the world. However, the coefficient of Mercosur is smaller than the
one of EuropeanUnion and it is not statistically significant. The coefficients of the
interaction terms have the expected negative signs, which means that small countries
in these regions have larger Trade/GDP . However, the coefficients for MERCOSUR
are again smaller compared to those of Europe and not statistically significant. In
summary, as expected Trade/GDP has a negative relation with country size. While
being part of the European Union has a positive and significant effect on Trade/GDP ,
being part of the MERCOSUR has a positive but not significant effect. Finally, the
estimated coefficient of the interaction between region and country size suggests that
small countries in Europe are more open and can benefit more from trade than small
countries in MERCOSUR.
7The countries I include in Europe are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
8I exclude small countries as a robustness check.
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Table 1: Trade and Country Size
(1) (2)
Population -4.153*** -5.786***
(0.332) (0.397)
Mercosur 21.352 -4.985
(49.016) (49.104)
Mercosur*Population -3.013 -1.395
(2.918) (2.924)
European Union 114.595*** 87.724***
(32.991) (33.159)
European Union*Population -6.884*** -5.235***
(2.000) (2.011)
Adj. R-squared 0.059 0.075
N 4519 4246
The dependent variable is Trade/GDP. The sample includes
all countries in the WDI sample. All regressions include year
fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2 presents the results of running equation 1 using as outcome variable net
FDI inflows/GDP (columns 1 and 2), or using as outcome variable FDI stock/GDP
(column 3 and 4). Again, for each outcome variable I estimate the equation for two
samples, one using all countries, and one excluding countries with less than 100 thousand
inhabitants.9 The expected signs of the parameters of interest of equation 1 are in line
with those discussed previously using Trade/GDP as outcome variable: negative for
Population, positive for the region fixed effects and negative for the interactions of region
and population. The results show that, as expected, the coefficient for Population is
negative and statistically significant. In the case of regions fixed effects the result for
Mercosur differs from the one expected, it is negative and slightly significant (for FDI
stock/GDP) or not significant (for net FDI inflows/GDP). For Europe, the results are
the expected ones, positive and significant. This suggests that while being part of the
European Union may increase the ability of countries to attract foreign firms, being
part of MERCOSUR may not. For the estimated coefficients of the interaction term we
find similar results, it is negative and significant for Europe, while it is positive and not
significant for MERCOSUR. This could indicate that small countries in MERCOSUR
cannot benefit from FDI as much as small countries in Europe do.
9For the UNCTAD dataset I exclude countries with less than 100 thousand workers.
8
Table 2: FDI and Country Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population -0.809*** -0.743*** -5.653*** -6.363***
(0.095) (0.092) (0.639) (0.730)
Mercosur -14.015 -12.938 -77.117* -83.389*
(13.379) (11.072) (44.024) (44.423)
Mercosur*Population 0.771 0.705 7.191 7.901
(0.796) (0.659) (4.775) (4.820)
European Union 72.985*** 74.154*** 138.011*** 131.739***
(9.372) (7.776) (26.493) (26.843)
European Union*Population -4.257*** -4.328*** -13.747*** -13.037***
(0.567) (0.470) (3.004) (3.044)
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.066 0.037 0.039
N 4283 4061 3430 3267
The dependent variable is Net FDI inflow/GDP for the first two columns and FDI stock/GDP
for the last two columns. The sample includes all countries in the WDI and UNCTAD sample.
All regressions include year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3 Model
The model builds on Melitz (2003) but adds the possibility of multinational production
and bridge multinational production. There is a set of countries with different sizes. In
each country there is a representative consumer. In the world economy there are two
types of goods: a homogeneous good and a differentiated good, both of them tradable.
Each differentiated good is produced by a firm with a given productivity. Differentiated
goods have three sub-indices: the first one indicates where the good is consumed, the
second one where the good is produced and the last one to which country the firm that
produced the good belongs. For example, qijk(ω) is the quantity of good ω consumed in
country i and produced in country j by a firm from country k.
3.1 Countries
The world economy consists of i = 1, ..., N countries; two sectors: a homogeneous good
sector (sector 0) and a differentiated good sector (sector 1); one factor of production,
labor; and a continuum of goods indexed by ω ∈ Ω. All goods in the economy are
tradable. Each country has a population of Li individuals who supply labor inelastically.
Let wi be the wage in country i in terms of the homogeneous good. I set the price of
the homogeneous good, P0, to be the numeraire. In each country there is a large mass
of potential firms producing.
3.2 Consumers
In each country there is a representative consumer with Cobb-Douglas preferences:
Ui = q
µ0
i,0q
(1−µ0)
i,1 , (2)
where µ0 is the share of the homogeneous good in total consumption and q1 is a Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator10 :
qi,1 =
(∫
qi(ω)
(σ−1)
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and qi,1 are all the varieties
consumed in country i.
The above utility function implies that the representative consumer will spend µ0
share of his income on the homogeneous good and 1− µ0 in differentiated goods. Then
10Where ρ = σ−1σ . I will use σ or ρ in my definitions depending on which is the most convenient.
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the demand functions are:
qi0 =
µ0Ei
P 0i
,
qi1 =
(1− µ0)Ei
P 0i
, (3)
where P 0i is the aggregate price index in country i including the homogeneous good
sector and Ei is the aggregate expenditure in country i.
Define the expenditure in the differentiated good sector as (1− µ0) ∗E = E1, where
E is total expenditure. Then, the demand for variety ω is given by:
qjki(ω) =
E1j
Pj
(
pjki(ω)
Pj
)−σ
, (4)
where E1j is the aggregate expenditure of country j in differentiated goods and Pj is the
aggregate price in the differentiated good sector in country j.11 The demand of good
qjki(ω) is increasing in total expenditure and the aggregate price of the country where
the good is consumed (E1j and Pj), and decreasing in the price of the good.
3.3 Homogeneous good
Each country has an exogenous endowment zi of the homogeneous good. This good is
traded without any cost. This implies that the price of this good will be equalized among
countries. We will denote the price of the homogeneous good as p0. Each country will
be an exporter or importer of this good depending on whether the domestic supply of
the good is bigger or smaller than the domestic demand of the good.
Without the homogenous good, the model would require trade imbalances to be
compensated by capital account imbalances to get a balanced current account. This
would imply that a country having a trade deficit would have a capital account surplus.
Capital account surplus in this model means that profits from domestic firms producing
abroad are larger than profits from foreign firms producing in the domestic country.
Introducing the homogenous good sector allows the model to have countries with both
trade deficit in the differentiated good and also capital account deficits, something that
is present in the Latin-American countries I am considering.
11I will give a formula for Pj later since I still need to define some concepts used in the definition of Pj .
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3.4 Differentiated good sector
3.4.1 Production
To produce the differentiated good the only input used is labor.12, 13 Firms pay a fixed
entry cost κei to make the labor productivity draw φ, denominated in labor units (then
what a firm pays is wi∗κei , where wi is the wage in country i). I assume that productivities
are drawn from a Pareto distribution. After observing the productivity, firms decide
whether to produce or not. If they decide to produce there are four activities that they
can perform.
Selling domestically. Firms have to pay a fixed cost of operation κdi , also denominated
in labor units, to produce domestically. In addition to this fixed cost, firms have to pay
the variable cost of production. The variable cost of selling domestically qiii(ω) units of
the good is:
ciii(ω) =
wi
φ
qiii(ω) .
Exporting from the domestic country. To export firms have to pay a fixed cost
(independent of the selling destination) and an iceberg type cost which is partner specific.
Firms producing in country i and exporting to country j pay a fixed cost wi ∗κxi and an
iceberg cost τji per unit sold i.e. they have to send τji ≥ 1 units of the good for one unit
to arrive at its destination. The variable cost of exporting qjii(ω) units of the good is:
cjii(ω) =
τji ∗ wi
φ
qjii(ω) .
Producing and selling abroad (MP). When a firm produces abroad its productivity
is shifted by a parameter γ. The new productivity of a firm from country i producing
in country k is φˆ = φγki . In addition, a firm from country i producing in country k has
to pay a fixed cost wk ∗ κMPk which is independent from the source country (all foreign
firms producing in country k pay the same fixed cost). κMPk includes the domestic cost of
producing in country k and an extra cost i.e. κMPk ≥ κdk. The variable cost of producing
abroad and selling qkki(ω) units in that country is:
ckki(ω) =
γki ∗ wk
φ
qkki(ω) .
12As a result, this paper analyzes horizontal FDI in the spirit of Markusen (1995). See Barba Navaretti and
Venables (2004) for a review of the literature on FDI (both vertical and horizontal FDI).
13The work of Irarrazabal et al. (2013) model trade with vertical FDI. When assuming that foreign firms
use imported intermediate goods as input, we are introducing complementarity between trade and MP. With
horizontal FDI and allowing for BMP, MP and trade can be substitutes or complements. Ramondo and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) on the other hand model both vertical and horizontal FDI.
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Note that the wage that is paid is that of the country where the firm is producing, in
this case country k.
Producing abroad and exporting (BMP). Finally, a firm that is producing abroad has
the option to export to a third country. In this case, the firm will have to pay an extra
fixed cost of exporting wk ∗ κxk. The variable cost for a firm from country i producing
abroad (in country k) and exporting qjki(ω) units of the good to country j is
cjki(ω) =
τjkγkiwk
φ
qjki(ω) .
Maximizing variable profits of a firm from country i for a given activity,
max
p(ω)
pi = p(ω)q(ω)− c(ω) , (5)
where q(ω) was defined in equation (4), we get the price of a variety, given by:
pjki(ω) =
wkγkiτjk
ρφ
. (6)
As each firm produces a different variety we can substitute, without loss of generality,
ω by φ. Using expression (4) and (6) we obtain the revenue associated with each activity.
Selling Domestically⇒ riii(φ) = E1i P σ−1i
(
ρφ
wi
)σ−1
Exporting from the home country⇒ rkii(φ) = E1kP σ−1k
(
ρφ
wiτki
)σ−1
(7)
Doing MP in country k ⇒ rkki(φ) = E1kP σ−1k
(
ρφ
wkγki
)σ−1
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ rjki(φ) = E1jP σ−1j
(
ρφ
wkγkiτjk
)σ−1
The next step is to find which firms are going to perform each activity. A firm will
perform an activity as long as the activity is profitable. Let’s start with firms selling
only domestically. A firm will sell domestically if
piiii(φ) =
E1i P
σ−1
i
σ
(
ρφ
wi
)σ−1
− κdiwi ≥ 0 (8)
As profits are increasing with productivities, there will be one productivity (the cut-off
productivity) for which profits will be equal to zero. I will denote the domestic produc-
tivity cut-off as φ∗iii. All firms with productivities higher than φ
∗
iii will sell domestically.
Now, firms can also export or produce abroad. Before continuing, let me assume the
following:
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Assumption 1: A variety is defined by the country of origin of the firm and the country
where the good is produced.
Assumption 2: Any firm from country i performing an activity has to pay the domestic
cost of producing in i.
With assumption 1 a firm from Uruguay producing in Uruguay and exporting to
Brazil is going to sell a different variety than the same firm producing in Brazil and
selling in Brazil. The fact that varieties are determined also by the production location
simplifies the solution of the problem allowing me to treat each activity as independent
activities.14,15 In the absence of assumption 1 a firm from Uruguay will have to choose
how to serve the Brazilian market (either by producing in Uruguay and exporting, by
doing MP in Brazil or by doing MP in a third country and exporting to Brazil) since
the variety sold is the same independently from the production location. Then, without
assumption 1 there will be more competition between countries for attracting MP, which
would increase the importance of the efficiency of multinationals operating in the domes-
tic country (parameter γ). Also, without assumption 1 BMP becomes a more important
factor for attracting MP. In the quantitative section I discuss in more detail the role of
assumption 1.
Assumption 2 ensures that there will be no firms exporting or doing MP and not
selling in the domestic country.
The profit for a firm from country i exporting to country k is given by:
pikii(φ) =
E1kP
σ−1
k
σ
(
ρφ
wiτki
)σ−1
− κxi wi (9)
Setting this equation equal to zero, we can find the cut-off productivity (φ∗kii) for a firm
from country i exporting to country k. To fix ideas, let us keep aside the possibility of
MP. Then, we have two possibilities for defining the exporting cut-offs:
Case 1: If all the exporting cut-offs are higher than the domestic cut-off in country i,
that is if φ∗iii < φ
∗
kii ∀k, then the domestic and the exporting cut-offs are well calculated.
Firms with productivities φ∗iii < φ < φ
∗
kii only sell in the domestic market, while firms
with productivities φ > φ∗kii sell domestically and export.
Case 2: If at least one exporting cut-off φ∗kii is lower than the domestic cut-off φ
∗
iii,
then we have to re-calculate cut-offs. Denote Kxi the set of countries k for which the
14Using assumption 1, I can extend the results from Melitz (2003) considering multinational production and
BMP just as an additional activity that simplifies the problem.
15It can be that in the end activities are not fully independent, but I can compute costs and profits for each
activity as if they were fully independent.
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exporting cut-off (from country i to country k) is lower than the domestic cut-off. For
countries k ∈ Kxi the exporting cut-off is equal to the domestic cut-off (φ∗iii = φ∗kii). The
marginal firm entering in the domestic market (with productivity φ∗iii) makes negative
profits selling in the domestic market but these negative profits are compensated by
the positive profits obtained by exporting to countries k ∈ Kxi . Then, the productivity
cut-off defined in the marginal entrant (φ∗iii) solves the following equation:
piiii(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k∈Kx
pikii(φ
∗
iii) = 0. (10)
Now let us consider the possibility for MP. Allowing for MP brings new cases for the
way the domestic cut-off is defined. The profit for a firm from country i producing and
selling in country k (performing MP in country k) is given by:
pikki(φ) =
E1kP
σ−1
k
σ
(
ρφ
wkγki
)σ−1
− κMPk wk (11)
To fix ideas, let us ignore the possibility of exporting. We want to focus on how MP
affects the calculation of the domestic cut-off. There are two cases again to consider:
Case 3: If all the MP cut-offs are higher than the domestic cut-off in country i, that
is if φ∗iii < φ
∗
kki ∀k, then the domestic and the MP cut-offs are well calculated. Firms
with productivities φ∗iii < φ < φ
∗
kki only sell in the domestic market, while firms with
productivities φ > φ∗kki sell domestically and perform MP.
Case 4: If at least one MP cut-off (φ∗kki) is lower than the domestic cut-off, then
we need to follow similar steps as in case 2. Denote by KMPki the set of countries
(k) for which the MP cut-off in country i (φ∗kki) is lower than the domestic cut-off in
country i (φ∗iii). For countries k ∈ KMPki the MP cut-off is equal to the domestic cut-off
φ∗kki = φ
∗
iii. The marginal firm entering into the domestic market (with productivity
φ∗iii) makes negative profits selling in the domestic market but these negative profits are
compensated by the positive profits obtained by performing MP in countries k ∈ KMPki .
Then, the productivity of the marginal entrant in country i solves the following equation:
piiii(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k∈KMPki
pikki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 (12)
If we assume that firms can export and do MP, the procedure is the same. The
only difference is that if we have exporting cut-offs and MP cut-offs that are below the
domestic cut-off, then the productivity of the marginal entrant in country i solves the
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following equation:
piiii(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k∈Kx
pikii(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k∈KMPki
pikki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 (13)
Finally, a firm may want to use a third country as an export platform (BMP). The
profit for a firm from country i, producing in country k and selling in country j is given
by:
pijki(φ) =
E1jP
σ−1
j
σ
(
ρφ
wkγkiτjk
)σ−1
− κxkwk (14)
Setting the above equation to zero, we can find the BMP cut-off productivity (φ∗jki) for
a firm from country i producing in country k and selling in country j. As in the previous
cases we have two cases:
Case 5 If all the BMP cut-off productivities for firms from country i producing in
country k (φ∗jki ∀j) are above the MP cut-off productivity for firms from country i
producing in country k (φ∗kki), then the BMP cut-offs are well calculated. Firms with
productivities φ∗kki < φ < φ
∗
jki sell domestically and produce and sell in country k, while
firms with productivities φ > φ∗jki sell domestically, produce and sell in country k and
also do BMP from country k to country j.
Case 6 If at least one BMP cut-off for firms from country i producing in country
k (φ∗jki ∀j) is below the MP cut-off productivity for firms from country i producing in
country k (φ∗kki), then we have to re-calculate the MP cut-off φ
∗
kki. Define J
BMP
ki the set
of countries for which the BMP cut-off (φ∗jki) is lower than the MP cut-off (φ
∗
kki). Then
the cut-off productivity for the marginal firm from country i performing MP in country
k and BMP to country j solves:
pikki(φ
∗
kki) +
∑
j∈JBMPki
pijki(φ
∗
kki) = 0 (15)
As firms performing BMP have to pay the fixed cost of producing abroad (κMP ) also,
there will be no firm performing BMP and not MP, which implies that the equilibrium
BMP cut-off is not going to be below the MP cut-off. After re-calculating the MP cut-off
we have to check if the new MP cut-off is larger than the domestic cut-off. If it is larger,
then the MP cut-off is well calculated, otherwise we need to re-calculate the domestic
cut-off which will be the one that solves:
piiii(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k∈KMPki
pikki(φ
∗
iii) +
∑
k 6=i
∑
j∈JBMPki
pijki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 , (16)
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In Appendix 3 I present the algorithm to calculate the cut-offs.
Profits
In summary, if φ∗iii < φ
∗
kii, φ
∗
iii < φ
∗
kki and φ
∗
kki < φ
∗
jki all the cut-offs are the ones
that come from equating the profit from each activity to zero, and so the marginal
firm performing each activity makes zero profit. Otherwise the marginal firm entering
into the domestic market can be making negative profits in the domestic market and
compensate these negative profits with positive profits in other activities, like exporting
or MP or both. Then, the profit made by a firm from country i is given by: to define
profits I need to use an indicator that allows me to know if an activity is operative or
not
pii(φ) = piiii(φ) +
∑
k 6=i
pikii(φ)I
x
kii +
∑
k 6=i
pikki(φ)I
MP
kki +
∑
k 6=i
∑
j 6=k
pijki(φ)I
BMP
jki , (17)
where Ixkii is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ
∗
kii and 0 otherwise,
IMPkki is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ
∗
kki and 0 otherwise, and
finally IBMPjki is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if φ > φ
∗
jki and 0.
16 Note
that for a firm with productivity φ it can be possible that the profit for some activities
is negative. For example, it can happen that for this firm the profit of opening a plant in
country k and selling to country k (pikki(φ), but the profit of producing in country k and
selling to country j are positive and more than compensates the negative profit. Finally,
as profits from every activity are increasing in φ (since σ−1 > 0), more productive firms
make higher profits, and so if the productivity is high enough a firm performs all the
activities.
3.4.2 Productivity distribution
Productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution with scale parameter φmi and shape
parameter αi.
17 Lets define the density function as gi(φ) = αi
(φmi )
αi
φαi+1
. As only firms with
productivities above φ∗iii will produce in country i, then the equilibrium distribution of
productivities of domestic firms is:
µi(φ) =
gi(φ)
1−G(φ∗iii)
if φ ≥ φ∗iii , (18)
16In the calibrated model economies there are no exporting or MP cut-offs lower than the domestic cut-off.
However, there are some BMP cut-offs smaller than the MP cut-offs.
17In a Pareto distribution the scale parameter indicates the minimum value that the random variable can
take.
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and 0 otherwise. The conditional probability of performing each of the other activities
is:
Exporting to country k ⇒ θkii = 1−G(φ
∗
kii)
1−G(φ∗iii)
Doing FDI in country k ⇒ θkki = 1−G(φ
∗
kki)
1−G(φ∗iii)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ θjki =
1−G(φ∗jki)
1−G(φ∗iii)
The average productivity for each activity can be calculated as:
φ˜jki =
[∫ ∞
φ∗jki
φσ−1µi(φ)dφ
]1/(σ−1)
(19)
for all i, j and k. Notice that φ˜jki only depends on the cut-off productivity.
Following Melitz (2003), we can consider that for each activity there is a representative
firm with productivity φ˜jki. The average productivity φ˜jki summarizes all the informa-
tion concerning each activity. This is convenient because now aggregate variables for
each activity can be expressed in terms of φ˜jki. One difference with respect to the case
of Melitz (2003) is that in his case it is possible to calculate an average productivity
for the whole economy that depends only on domestic firms. In this paper, the average
productivity of a country will be given by the domestic firms producing domestically and
also by foreign firms producing domestically. Then, aggregate variables for the whole
economy will depend not only on the domestic mass of firms but also on the mass of
firms from the rest of the countries.
Evaluating revenues at the average productivity level and making the ratio of this
revenue with a revenue evaluated at any other productivity level we find that:
r(φ˜iii)
riii(φ)
=
E1i P
σ−1
i
(
ρφ˜iii
wi
)σ−1
E1i P
σ−1
i
(
ρφ
wi
)σ−1 ⇒ r(φ˜iii) =
(
φ˜iii
φ
)σ−1
riii(φ) (20)
We can get the previous relation for each activity: exporting, doing MP and doing BMP.
Exporting to country k ⇒ r(φ˜kii) =
(
φ˜kii
φ
)σ−1
rkii(φ)
Doing MP in country k ⇒ r(φ˜kki) =
(
φ˜kki
φ
)σ−1
rkki(φ)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ r(φ˜jki) =
(
φ˜jki
φ
)σ−1
rjki(φ)
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3.4.3 Sales distribution
Sales for a given activity are given by rjki = E
1
j
(
Pjρφ
wkγkiτjk
)σ−1
, where E1j is aggregate
expenditure in differentiated goods in country j. Given that productivities are drawn
from a Pareto distribution it is possible to obtain the distribution of sales for each
activity analytically. I will present the result for domestic firms selling domestically, but
the expression is analog for the other activities.
prob(riii(φ) > y) = prob
(
E1i
(
Piρφ
wi
)σ−1
> y
)
= prob
(
φ >
(
y
E1i
) wi
1−σ wi
Piρ
)
.
As φ is distributed Pareto we can calculate this probability to be
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
 φmi(
y
E1i
) 1
1−σ wi
Piρ

α
,
where φm,i is the scale parameter (the minimum value that φ can take) of the Pareto
distribution. We can write the above expression as:
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
(
(E1i )
1/(σ−1)(Piρφmi /wi)
y1/(σ−1)
)α
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
(
E1i (Piρφ
m
i /wi)
(σ−1)
y
)α/(σ−1)
prob(riii(φ) > y) =
(
rmi
y
)α/(σ−1)
where rmi (φ
m
i ) = E
1
i (Piρφ
m
i )
σ−1 is the revenue of a firm from country i with productivity
equal to φm,i producing and selling domestically. Then riii(φ) is distributed Pareto with
scale parameter rm,i and shape parameter α/(σ − 1). This would be the distribution of
sales if all the firms were producing. But, as we stated previously, there will be some
firms (the ones with productivity between φm,i and φ
∗
iii) which are not going to produce.
Then, the true distribution of sales will be a truncation of the previous distribution. The
Pareto distribution has the property that if it is truncated, the remaining distribution is
still Pareto with the same shape parameter. Then sales (riii(φ)) are distributed Pareto
with scale parameter riii(φ
∗) and shape parameter α/(σ−1), where riii(φ∗) are the sales
of a firm with the cut-off productivity.
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For the rest of activities we can operate in a similar way and we obtain:
Exporting firms⇒ prob(rkii > y) =
E1k
(
Pkρφ
m
i
wkτki
)(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
Doing FDI in country k ⇒ prob(rkki > y) =
E1k
(
Pkρφ
m
i
wkγki
)(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ prob(rjki > y) =
E1j
(
Pjρφ
m
i
wkτjkγki
)(σ−1)
y

α/(σ−1)
where the numerator of each equation is the sales for each activity that correspond
to the minimum productivity level. As in the case of domestic sales, the equilibrium
distribution of sales for each activity is going to be Pareto with shape parameter α/(σ−1)
and scale parameter r(φ∗jki), where r(φ
∗
jki) is sales of a firm with the cut-off productivity
level for a firm from country i producing in country k and selling to country j.
3.4.4 Average Profits
Replacing (19) in the profit equations we can calculate average profits in terms of average
productivities. In the case that each individual activity makes zero profit at the cut-off
level, we can calculate average profit for each activity as:
Selling Domestically⇒ p¯iiii = κdiwi
( φ˜iii
φ∗iii
)σ−1
− 1

Exporting from the home country⇒ p¯ikii = κxi wi
( φ˜kii
φ∗kii
)σ−1
− 1

Doing MP in country k ⇒ p¯ikki = κMPk wk
( φ˜kki
φ∗kki
)σ−1
− 1

Doing BMP in k to sell in j ⇒ p¯ijki = κxkwk
( φ˜jki
φ∗jki
)σ−1
− 1

If the profit at the cut-off level is not zero, then the average profit for that activity is
obtained using equation (20). We can calculate the average profit of a firm from country
i as:
p¯ii = p¯iiii +
∑
k 6=i
θkiip¯ikii +
∑
k 6=i
θkkip¯ikki +
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
θjkip¯ijki . (21)
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Notice that profits are a function of aggregate expenditures E1i . Aggregate expendi-
ture is determined, among other factors, by the population size. Hence, the profitability
of a foreign firm depends on the selling country size. Given two countries with similar
variable and fixed trade costs, a multinational plant will prefer to get installed in the
bigger country. As a result, a small country will attract less investment than a bigger
one. For example, assume that the country where the good is going to be consumed
is Uruguay, and a firm from Japan is considering the different possibilities of serving
Uruguay. If the fixed export cost in Japan is high, then it could be better to produce the
good directly in Uruguay. This will be the case if the fixed cost to open a subsidiary in
Uruguay is not very high and also the productivity loss for producing abroad (γUru,Jap)
is low. Now, imagine that Japan is also considering to sell to Argentina, and that the
productivity loss of producing in Argentina for a Japanese firm is the same as in Uruguay
γArg,Jap = γUru,Jap. Then, as Argentina is bigger, E
1
Arg > E
1
Uru. If aggregate prices,
wages, and fixed costs are not very different, the Japanese firm will prefer to produce
in Argentina to producing in Uruguay. In other words, the productivity required by a
Japanese firm to start producing in Argentina is lower (ceteris paribus) than that re-
quired to produce in Uruguay. This implies that more firms get located in Argentina.
Size, then, is crucial to attract foreign investment.
3.4.5 Mass of Firms
Define M ei to be the total mass of firms making a productivity draw in country i,
and Mi as the mass of firms finally operating. By definition, the total mass of firms
operating should be equal to the total mass of firms making a productivity draw times
the probability of successful entry, which is θiiiM
e
i = Mi.
In the case of an open economy without FDI we can obtain Mi in the same way as in
Melitz (2003). Mi = Ri/r¯i, where Ri = wiLi denotes aggregate revenue and aggregate
expenditure, and r¯i denotes average revenue. In Melitz (2003), aggregate revenue and
total payment to labor are equal because total profits (Π) are equal to the payment to
labor used in making the productivity draw (κeiwi) in equilibrium and only domestic
firms produce in country i.
When foreign firms are allowed to produce in the domestic country Ri 6= wiLi. The
equality does not hold because foreign firms send their profits abroad, and domestic firms
producing abroad bring their profits home, making total expenditure in the country also
a function of profits of domestic firms abroad. However, it is still true that wiL
e
i = Πi
(where Lei is labor used in entering)
18, but the determination for labor used in production
18This is obtained using the equation for total payment to labor used in entering and the free entry condition,
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(Lpi ) is different. Now the total payment to labor in country i is equal to revenue
minus profits of firms producing in i, which can include foreign firms. In equations,
wiL
p
i = Rˆi − Πˆi where Rˆi and Πˆi are revenues and profits of firms producing in country
i (domestic or foreign).
The total mass of firms performing each of the other activities is obtained by multi-
plying the mass of firms operating, Mi, by the conditional probability of performing the
activity Mjki = θjkiMi.
3.4.6 Aggregation
We define aggregate price and GDP in country i as:
Pi =
[∫
φ∗iii
(piii(φ))
1−σMiµi(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikk
(pikk(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ (22)
+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
(piik(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikj
(pikj(φ))
1−σMjµj(φ)dφ
] 1
1−σ
,
GDPi =
∫
φ∗iii
riii(φ)Miµidφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kii
rkii(φ)Miµidφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
riik(φ)Mkµkdφ
+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kij
rkij(φ)Mjµjdφ . (23)
We can re-write the aggregate price and GDP of country i in terms of weighted
average productivities.19 Let’s define Mpi as the mass of firms producing in country i
and M si as the mass of firms selling goods to country i. Then,
Mpi = Mi +
∑
k 6=i
Miik +
∑
k 6=i
∑
i 6=j
Mjik ,
M si = Mi +
∑
k 6=i
Miik +
∑
k 6=j
∑
i 6=j
Mijk . (24)
Having defined the mass of firms producing and selling in each country we can define
which I explain later.
19Following Melitz (2003).
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the weighted average productivity of firms producing (φ˜pi ) and selling (φ˜
s
i ) as:
φ˜pi =
{
1
Mpi
[
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
∑
k 6=i
Mkii
E1k
E1i
(
Pk
τkiPi
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1kii +
∑
k 6=i
Miik
(
1
γik
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1iik
+
∑
k 6=i
∑
i 6=j
Mjik
E1j
E1i
(
Pj
τjiγik
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1jik
]} 1σ−1
, (25)
φ˜si =
{
1
M si
[
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
∑
k 6=i
Mikk
(
wkτik
wi
)1−σ
φ˜σ−1ikk +
∑
k 6=i
Miikγ
1−σ
ik φ˜
σ−1
iik
+
∑
k 6=i
∑
i 6=j
Mijk
(
τijγjkwk
wi
)1−σ
φ˜σ−1ijk
]} 1σ−1
. (26)
Using these two equations we can define aggregate price and aggregate production in
the differentiated good sector in country i as:20
Pi = (M
s
i )
1
1−σ p(φ˜si ) = (M
s
i )
1
1−σ
wi
ρφ˜si
, (27)
GDPi = M
p
i Ei
(
Piρφ˜
p
i
wi
)σ−1
. (28)
3.5 Trade and Multinational Production
The trade of a country will be given by the amount of exports and imports. Exports
are composed by all the sales to foreign countries from firms (either domestic or foreign)
producing in the domestic country. The expression for total exports in the differentiated
good sector is given by:
Exportsi = Xi =
∑
k 6=i
Mkiirkii(φ˜kii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports by Domestic Firms
+
∑
k 6=i
∑
k 6=j
Mjikrjik(φ˜jik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports by Foreign Firms
.
In a similar way, imports in the differentiated good sector are all the goods consumed
in the domestic country and produced in a foreign country. So total imports are:
Importsi = IMi =
∑
k 6=i
Mikkrikk(φ˜ikk) +
∑
k 6=i
∑
k 6=j
Mijkrijk(φ˜ijk) .
The capital account is composed of the difference between the profits of domestic firms
producing abroad and the profits of foreign firms producing in the domestic country.
Capital Accounti =
∑
k
∑
j 6=i
Mkjip¯ikji −
∑
k
∑
j 6=i
Mkijp¯ikij .
20Proof in the appendix.
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The Current Account (CA) is the sum of Trade Balance (TB) TBi = (zi−qi0)+Xi−IMi
where (zi−qi0) is net exports of the homogeneous good, and the capital account balance.
The current account balance equation can be written as:
CAi = (zi − qi0) +Xi − IMi +
∑
k
∑
j 6=i
Mkjip¯ikji −
∑
k
∑
j 6=i
Mkijp¯ikij . (29)
3.6 Equilibrium
Equation (21) defines the Zero Cut-off Profit Condition (ZCPC), which expresses the
average profit of a firm from country i as a function of the domestic cut-offs, the mass
of firms operating in each country, and wages. The net value of a firm from country i is
then vi = p¯ii. As there is free entry, the expected profit of a firm before making a draw
should be zero, otherwise more firms will enter until this condition is satisfied. Define
the net value of an entering firm as vei . In equilibrium v
e
i should be equal to zero. Then
the free entry condition (FEC) can be expressed as:
vei = θiiip¯ii − κeiwi = 0 , (30)
which says that the average value of a firm producing in country i times the probability
of successful entry should be equal to the entry cost (the cost of making the productivity
draw). θiii is a function of the scale (φ
m
i ) and shape (α) parameters of the productivity
distribution and of the domestic cut-off (φ∗iii). Rearranging terms in equation (30) we
get p¯ii =
κeiwi
θiii
.
In order to solve for the equilibrium we need to find 3 ∗N + 1 variables: N cut-offs
(φiii ∀i); N numbers for the mass of firms for each country (Mi ∀i); N wages (wi) and
1 price (p0) . Normalizing the price of the homogeneous good to one we end up with
3 ∗N endogenous variables. The set of 3 ∗Nequations are given by:
• Free entry condition equal to zero cut-off profit condition.
• Current account balance condition.
• Labor market clearing condition.
Definition: Given zi0, τij, γij, κ
e
i , κ
d
i , κ
x
i , κ
MP
i , gi(φ), Li and N ∀i, j = 1, ..., N ,
a multinational production equilibrium is a set of wages wi, price indices, Pi,
income, GNPi,mass of firms Mi, mass of entrants, M
e
i , allocations for the representative
consumer qjki(φ) and prices, pjki(φ), for firms such that:
1. In all countries, given prices and aggregate expenditure, consumers demand choices
(qjki(φ) and qio) satisfy (3) and (4).
2. In all countries, firms maximize profits from all activities (equation (6) solves (5)).
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3. Pi satisfies equation (22)
4. Labor markets clear.
5. Free entry condition: vei = 0 (see equation (30)).
6. Current Account balance condition is zero (see equation (29)).
7. The mass of firms producing is equal to the mass of firms taking the productivity
draw times the probability that the draw is bigger than the domestic cut-off,
Mi = θiiiM
e
i
8. World demand of the homogeneous good is equal to world supply:
∑
i zi =
∑
i qi0.
4 Calibration
4.1 Data
I use data from four different sources to calibrate the model: The World Bank Enterprise
Survey (WBES), the United Nations (UNCTAD), OECD Stan, and the database on
bilateral trade flows from Waugh (2010).
World Bank Enterprise Survey: This database is a stratified sample of the
universe of firms in developing countries. I use the standardized survey, which has data
starting in 2006. This database is being updated continuously, and for many countries
there is already a panel of two years. I use this database to obtain statistics related to
firms’ performance for South American countries : a) proportion of exporting firms; b)
proportion of foreign firms. I consider only firms in the manufacturing sector.
UNCTAD: I use the Foreign Direct Investment profile for the Latin-American coun-
tries under study. I use data on the origin of the stock of FDI by country.
OECD Stan: I use data on the production by multinational firms and proportion
of firms exporting for Europe.
Waugh(2010): This data-base contains information on trade for a large set of
countries for the year 1996, including Latin-American and European countries. I use
trade statistics (exports and imports) by origin and destiny in order to construct bilateral
trade flows between countries and the absorption measure reported.
4.2 Calibration Strategy:
I calibrate the model separately for two regions: South America and Europe. I select
these regions because they both present very different trade arrangements. While South
America is characterized by high trade barriers, Europe is well-known as a low trade
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barrier area for the members of the European Union. Analyzing the differences in the
gains from openness in these two regions for countries of different size provides informa-
tion on how much countries in the closed region are losing compared to those in the open
region, and how much could be the potential gains of becoming more open. To maintain
symmetry I will include in both calibrations five countries, four belonging to the region
and a fifth which stands for the rest of the world (RW). The countries included in each
regions are (i) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay in South America; and (ii)France, Italy,
Netherlands and United Kingdom in Europe.
I will use data for 1996 whenever it is possible.21 OECD Stan database has informa-
tion on sales of multinationals only for the late 2000’s. I will use data for 2007 which is
the earliest year for which they have data for all countries. The parameters I need to
calibrate are:
• Size (Li): I use data from the UNCTAD on labor force. I normalize Uruguay’s size
to 1 (LUru = 1). Country sizes are then LArg = 9.47, LBra = 48.94, LChi = 3.69
and LRW = 1582.5.
22 For Europe, country sizes are: LFra = 16.8, LIta = 14.9,
LUK = 18.7 and the LRW = 1567.3.
• Substitutability between varieties (σ): I use a value of 6 which generates a
mark-up of 20%, as is common in the literature (for example in Ghironi and Melitz
(2005)).
• Productivity distribution: I assume that productivities are drawn from a Pareto
distribution with scale parameter φm = 1 for all countries. I will assume that all
countries have the same shape parameter α. Given the Pareto assumption for
productivities, sales are distributed Pareto with shape parameter α/(σ−1). There
is a large discussion in the literature about the value of α and α/(σ − 1). Chaney
(2008) finds that αi/(σ − 1) is around 2 for the US, but he does not calculate the
value of α and σ. Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) use α = 4. Breinlich and Cun˜at
(2010) estimate α/(σ − 1) and find values ranging from 1.13 to 4.88. Arkolakis et
al. (2013) use α = 4.2. Finally, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) estimate α/(σ− 1)
from Brazilian data and find a value of 1.21. I use the estimate of Arkolakis and
Muendler (2010) for two reasons. First, because they estimate the shape parameter
of sales from Brazilian data, one of the countries I am studying. Second, because
σ = 6 implies α = 6.05 which is in the middle range of previous estimates.
21In 1995 the MERCOSUR members should have had the last reduction in tariffs for trade within the region,
and a common tariff for the rest of the world. For a more detailed discussion on this see Bustos (2011).
22To calculate the RW I take out Russia and Germany from all the variables, two big countries not included
in Waugh (2010).
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• Fixed entry cost (κei ): In order to make a productivity draw, firms in country i
should pay a fixed cost κei . I calibrate this parameter to match the GDP per capita
in each country relative to the RW for the year 1996.
• Fixed operating cost (κdi ): If a firm decides to operate, it has to pay a fixed cost
(κdi ). I will set the value of this parameter such that the smallest firm producing in
each country demands 10 workers. The amount of labor demanded by the smallest
firm is:
`(φ∗iii) = σκ
d
i . (31)
As equation (31) shows, labor demand of the firm with productivity level equal
to the domestic cut-off productivity only depends on σ and κdi .
23 As all countries
have the same σ, all countries should have the same κdi in order to obtain that the
smallest firm demands ten workers in all countries. I thus set κdi = 10/6 for all i.
• Fixed cost of exporting (κxi ): In order to export, a firm has to pay an additional
fixed cost (κxi ). This cost directly affects the mass of firms deciding to export. I will
use the proportion of firms exporting as a fraction of the total number of operating
firms. For South America I use firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey to calculate this statistic in the data. For Europe, I use the OECD Stan
dataset.
• Fixed cost of doing MP (κMPi ): To operate in a foreign country, a firm has
to pay a fixed cost of (κMPi ) in the country where the firm will open the plant. I
will calibrate this parameter to match the proportion of foreign firms in a given
country. As this cost increases, the proportion of foreign firms decreases. I use
data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey to construct this statistic in the data
for South America and OECD Stan for Europe.
• Iceberg cost of exporting (τji): In order to deliver one unit to country j, firm
in country i has to deliver τji units. These parameters are pinned down to target
Tradeji over Absorptioni
24 across the countries in my study. I use data from
Waugh (2010) on trade of manufactures to construct these targets.
• Productivity shifter (γji): When a firm produces abroad the productivity of
a firm is shift by γji. The new productivity for a firm from country i producing
in country j is φˆ = φγji . To calibrate this parameter I use the proportion of sales
from foreign firms in the domestic country. I do not allow firms from the countries
23See proof in the appendix.
24Tradeji is imports of country i from country j plus exports from country i to country j. Absorption is
calculated as GDPi + Importsi − Exportsi.
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in the sample to perform FDI in the rest of the world. Using data from the
WBES I compute the participation of foreign sales on total sales. Unfortunately,
this database does not have the country of origin of foreign firms. So, I use the
composition of FDI stock in manufactures to impute these values. The data on
FDI stock in manufactures come from the UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment
profile for South America and OECD Stan for Europe.
• Endowment of the homogeneous good (zi): I use the trade deficit in the
manufacturing sector to calibrate this parameter.
4.3 Calibration Results
Tables 3 to 8 present the calibrated parameters. Panel A of each table presents the results
for South America, while Panel B presents the results for Europe. The model performs
well in matching the selected targets. The GDP per capita of the RW is normalized to 1.
To match the much higher GDP per capita in Europe relative to the RW (see Table 8), I
need to impose much lower entry costs in Europe than in South America (second column
of Table 3). Table 4 shows that the model also matches the trade balance over absorption
in the manufacturing sector, even though it slightly overestimates Italian trade surplus
(9.5 in the model versus 8.9 in data). For the proportion of firms exporting (first column
of Table 3) and the participation of foreign firms sales in total sales (Table 7), the model
is able to match the data almost perfectly for all countries.
To match the trade statistics I use variable and fixed trade costs. Note that Argentina
and Brazil, the two largest countries in South America, show lower ratios of Trade-to-
Absorption, 35.8% and 22.8% respectively. On the other hand, Chile and Uruguay, the
smallest countries, show much higher ratios: 59.4% and 58.3%. In order to match the
large proportion of domestic firms exporting in Argentina, the model requires small fixed
costs of exporting for this country (see column four of Table 3). This also allows smaller
firms to enter into the export market, making it possible to match at the same time the
large proportion of firms exporting and the relatively low trade-to-absorption ratio. The
importance of the RW as a trade partner is also shown in the calibrated parameters.
Participation of the RW in trade goes from 51% for Uruguay to 86% for Chile. As a
result Chile, with high variable trade cost of exporting to the rest of South American
countries, presents a low average variable trade cost (compared to the levels of Argentina
and Brazil around 100%). Uruguay is the country in the region with the highest average
variable trade costs (124%), something unexpected since it is the smallest country.25
25Small countries are those who benefit the most from openness according to traditional trade theory.
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For Europe we can immediately observe that trade-to-absorption is much higher than in
South America. Italy, the country with the lowest ratio has a value of 44.1%, while the
Netherlands, the country with the highest ratio, exhibits a ratio of 118.1%. In order to
match the higher ratio, the model requires much smaller trade costs. This is shown in
Figure 1, which shows the average trade costs by country (both the simple average or
a weighted by trade composition average). It can be easily seen that South American
countries face much higher average trade costs than European countries. The weighted
average trade cost in South America is 111% (so the average variable cost is τ = 2.11),
while in Europe it is 65% (the average variable cost in Europe is τ = 1.649). Another
interesting fact is that while in Europe the smallest country, the Netherlands, faces the
lowest trade cost, in South America the smallest country, Uruguay, faces the highest
average trade costs.
Similar observations apply to multinational production.26 As in the case of trade
costs, the efficiency parameter γ is much higher for South America than Europe (see
Table 7). This implies that foreign firms are much less productive operating abroad in
South America than in Europe. The average value of this parameter is 1.92 in South
America, while it is 0.58 in Europe. The fact that in Europe the average γ is smaller
than one is mainly driven by the productivity of firms from the RW operating abroad.
Firms from the RW operating in Europe are three times more efficient than in their
domestic countries. Then, as most of the MP comes from the RW, the average γ in
Europe is smaller than one.
To sum up, the baseline model is consistent with cross country evidence on bilateral
trade flows and multinational production for the set of selected countries. South America
faces higher trade barriers than Europe, and these trade barriers vary with country size
among regions. While the smallest country in Europe (the Netherlands) is the one with
the smallest average trade costs, Uruguay, the smallest country in South America is the
one with the highest average trade cost. Also, South American countries cannot attract
as much MP as European countries because the productivity of multinationals operating
in South America is much lower than the productivity of multinationals operating in
Europe.
5 Experiments
I use the calibrated model to perform a set of counterfactual experiments. First, I
investigate how much countries benefit from trade and MP by closing the economies (a
26I set a value of 100 to γij when there are zeros in the data.
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world in autarky), and study the role played by MP and BMP in countries of different
size. Then, I reduce trade and MP costs in South America and study the potential gains
in real GDP. Finally, I analyze the role of trade and MP in shaping the distribution of
firm size in countries of different size in the two regions. In summary, I will quantitative
study the following:
1. To assess the low gains from trade and MP attained by South America relative to
Europe, I compute the losses (changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP) of
moving to autarky in South America relative to Europe.
2. To assess the role played by MP and BMP in explaining the previous results I
perform three exercises:
• To assess the role played by BMP, I compare the losses of moving to autarky
in a world with and without BMP.
• To assess the role of MP itself (without including BMP), I set up a world
without BMP, and compare the losses of moving to autarky with and without
MP.
• To assess the role played by MP as a whole (including BMP), I compare the
losses of moving to autarky in a world with and without MP.
3. To assess the potential gains from an improvement in the degree of openness in
South America, I compute the changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP of
decreasing trade costs in South America to the average level in Europe with three
different configurations:
• Maintaining the same multinational production costs.
• Increasing the efficiency of foreign firms producing in South America by 20%.
• Increasing the efficiency of foreign firms producing only in Uruguay by 20%.
4. To assess the effects of MP and trade on firm size distribution, I compute the
proportion of firms with more than 100 and 250 employees in the baseline economy,
in an economy without MP and in an economy in autarky.
5.1 Gains from Openness
To study the gains from openness, I close the economies to trade and MP (a world in
autarky). In autarky, γij = τij = ∞. The first two columns of Table 9 present the
changes in real manufacturing GDP and GNP using as benchmark the calibrated model
economies. Panel A presents the results for South America and Panel B for Europe.
Losses of moving to autarky in Europe are much larger than in South America (10.5%
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versus 5.3% of real GDP) which indicates that Europe benefits much more from openness
than South America. This is expected since trade costs are higher and a efficiency of
foreign firms is lower in South America compared to Europe. Small countries lose more
than large countries in both regions. The higher degree of openness in Europe results in
larger differences between the country that loses the most and the country that loses the
least compared to South America. In Europe, the Netherlands loses 20.3% of real GDP
and Italy loses 5.6% (almost 15 percentage points difference), while in South America,
the difference between the losses of Uruguay and Brazil is 8.5 percentage points.
The last two columns of Table 9 present the changes in real manufacturing GDP and
GNP using as benchmark a modified version of the baseline economy, an economy where
BMP is not allowed. Allowing for BMP introduces an extra possibility for foreign firms,
the possibility of using a third country as an export platform. However, the extent to
which they will be able to benefit from exports will be determined by trade barriers.
Comparing the results of the third column, to the one of the first column, we can see that
BMP is more important in small countries than in large countries, and that European
countries benefit more from BMP. The losses for the Netherlands in a world without
BMP are 4 p.p lower than in the benchmark economy, while for Uruguay are only 1.2
p.p. lower. Then, high trade barriers not only affect the exports of domestic firms but
also the exports of foreign firms, and as a result the ability of small countries to attract
multinational firms.
5.1.1 The role played by MP and BMP
To disentangle the role played by MP and BMP in the gains from openness, I perform
three experiments. The results of these three exercises are presented in Table 10.
To assess the role played by BMP in explaining the gains from openness, I compute
the ratio between the losses of going to autarky in the baseline economy and the losses of
going to autarky in a world without BMP. If this ratio is 1 it means that BMP plays no
role in explaining the gains from openness, while BMP becomes more important as this
ratio increases. The first column of Table 10 presents the results. The ratio is larger for
small countries than for large countries, and also tends to be higher in Europe than in
South America. In Uruguay the losses of going to autarky in the baseline economy are
11.2% higher than in the case without BMP and in the Netherlands this number goes
up to 19.9%, while for Brazil and Italy this ratio is 1.035 and 1.097 respectively. Then,
small countries benefit more from BMP as expected.
To assess the role played by MP itself (this means MP without the possibility of
BMP), I compute the ratio between the losses of going to autarky in a world without
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BMP and the losses of going to autarky in a world without MP. This ratio shows the
importance of MP itself in explaining the gains from MP as a whole. If the ratio is
close to 1 it means that the gains from MP mostly come through BMP, while as this
ratio increases it means that MP itself becomes more important (and as a result BMP
becomes less important) in explaining the gains from MP. The second column of Table
10 presents the results. In Europe, Italy loses 84% more going to autarky in a world
without MP compared to a world without BMP, but the Netherlands loses only 20%
more. As expected MP itself is more important in explaining the gains from MP in
the large country than in the small one. In South America both Brazil and Uruguay
present the same ratio 1.51. This happens because the efficiency of multinational firms
operating in Brazil is very low, and so MP is not a very cheap way of overcoming trade
barriers. However, another large country like Argentina has a ratio much higher (2.033)
than the one of Uruguay.
Finally, to asses the role played by MP through both channels, I compute the ratio
between the losses of going to autarky in the baseline economy and the losses of going
to autarky in a world without MP. If this ratio is 1 it means that MP plays no role in
explaining the gains from openness, while as it increases it means that MP becomes more
important in explaining the gains from openness. The third column of Table 10 presents
the results. Large countries display the highest gains from MP. In South America the
country that benefits the most is Argentina and in Europe Italy. In Europe, the country
that benefit the least from MP is the Netherlands, the smallest country, while in South
America it is Brazil, the largest country. The underlying message is the same as in the
previous exercise: since in Brazil the efficiency of multinational firms is low, the role
played by MP is lower. Also, as South America as a region is closed then the gains from
trade are not very large, which increases the importance of MP in explaining the gains
from openness.
To sum up, if countries face relatively low trade costs and high efficiency of foreign
firms, large countries benefit more from MP as a whole, with small countries benefit-
ting more from BMP. On the other hand, if trade costs are high and the efficiency of
multinationals is low the large country may not benefit from MP more than the small
country.
5.2 Reducing trade costs and improving efficiency
To study the potential gains in South America of an improvement in the degree of
openness, I reduce the average trade costs for all countries in the calibration for South
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America to the average level in Europe (τ = 1.64).27
Panel A of Table 11 presents the result of reducing trade costs only in South America
to the average level in Europe (i.e. imposing τ = 1.64 to all South American countries).
All countries gain by reducing trade costs, but the smallest country, Uruguay, gains
significantly more. The gains in Uruguay are 29.9% of real manufacturing GDP, while
in Brazil, the largest country, are just 4%. I find, as Eaton and Kortum (2002), that
the gains from reducing trade costs are larger than the losses of going to autarky. Thus,
just by reducing trade barriers South America can obtain large gains.
To assess the potential gains South American countries may obtain from the in-
teraction of trade and MP, in addition to the reduction in trade costs I increase the
productivity of multinational firms by 20%. Panel B of Table 11 presents the results of
this experiment. There is a large gain in real manufacturing GDP in all countries, but
specially in large countries. However, since multinational firms send their profits back,
the increase is not reflected in a large increase in real manufacturing GNP, except for
Uruguay. In Uruguay, real manufacturing GDP increases more than 9 percentage points
relative to the previous experiment, while real manufacturing GNP increases almost 7
percentage points more relative to the previous experiment.
Panel C of Table 11 presents the result of increasing only the efficiency to multina-
tionals operating in Uruguay by the same magnitude as in the previous exercise. Changes
in real manufacturing GDP for the rest of countries are the same as in the case of only
reducing trade costs, while in Uruguay it increases by 12 percentage points in addition.
An interesting result from these experiments is that Uruguay would gain more if the
efficiency improves only domestically compared to the case where it improves in all the
countries of the region. This is because if the efficiency only improves in Uruguay there
is a larger set of multinationals going to this country.
Discussion on Bridge Multinational Production
The previous experiments reflect the importance of BMP for a small country. In the
absence of BMP, the gains in real manufacturing GDP of reducing trade barriers decrease
for all countries, but they decrease significantly more for Uruguay. In Uruguay the gains
are reduced by 6.2 p.p. while in Brazil they are only reduced in 0.3 p.p. (see Panel
A of Table 11, column 3). When trade costs are reduced, small countries can attract
more foreign firms who will locate there to export to the rest of countries, explaining
the importance of BMP. This indicates that, for small countries like Uruguay to take
27Trade barriers can be reduced by reducing trade tariffs within the region and also with the RW, improving
the available infrastructures, forcing countries to respect trade agreements, etc.
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advantage of MP, it needs to be able to export to the rest of countries in the region.
Panel B of Table 11 shows in the third column the increase in manufacturing real
GDP when in addition to the reduction in trade costs we increase the efficiency of foreign
firms but we do not allow for BMP. Compared to the numbers in Panel A we see that
Uruguay is the country with the smallest additional increase in manufacturing real GDP
(0.7 p.p.) while the remaining countries show increases that go from 1.9 p.p. to 4 p.p.
This result indicates that BMP is crucial for Uruguay to benefit from increases in the
efficiency of multinationals since otherwise the gains would not be larger than the ones
it would get by only reducing trade costs.
Finally, if we improved only the efficiency of foreign firms operating in Uruguay we
again find that BMP is crucial to explain the gains. While in the baseline economy real
manufacturing GDP increases 10.9 p.p. more than when we only reduce trade costs, if
we shut down BMP the additional increase is only of 2.3 p.p. The result is explained
because without the possibility of serving third countries Uruguay does not become
an attractive location for multinational firms, even with the increase in productivity,
because its domestic market is small.
Discussion on the Role of Assumption 1
Assumption 1 allows me to treat each activity as independent. With assumption 1 a firm
located in Uruguay and exporting to Brazil is going to produce a different good than
a firm that decided to locate in Brazil and sell in Brazil. Using the fact that activities
are independent I can calculate profits for each activity separately which simplifies the
solution of the problem. Without assumption 1 a firm would have to choose from which
location to serve each market. With assumption 1 a firm can serve one market from all
the locations. Then, assumption 1 reduces the degree of competition between countries
to attract MP. The decrease in competition also reduces the importance of the efficiency
of multinationals operating in my country. Without assumption 1, a firm will choose
to locate in the country that is more efficient, and the remaining countries will not be
able to attract this firm (as long as trade costs are low enough). Now, all countries may
attract MP as long as the activity is profitable for a firm. Then the gains I obtained
from reducing trade barriers and improving efficiency will be higher without assumption
1 for the most efficient country (the one that will be able able to attract larger amounts
of MP).
The importance of assumption 1 is closely link to the role played by BMP. Without
assumption 1, BMP is crucial for the most efficient market to be able to attract MP,
specially if the most efficient country is small, since what the firm wants is to serve all
countries from the cheapest location (and as opening plants in other countries involves
paying a fixed cost, firms may want to minimize the number of locations). The small
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country, even though it is efficient is not going to attract MP since the domestic market
is small. Then, BMP becomes a very important factor without assumption 1. Then,
my results are a lower bound for the importance of BMP. The importance of BMP for a
small country in the open region, like the Netherlands, might be underestimated if the
country is used as an export platform to serve the remaining European countries. Also
the differences between how much BMP contributes to the gains from openness between
Uruguay and the Netherlands (the small countries in each region) will be enhanced
without assumption 1.
To sum up, assumption 1 simplifies the solution of the problem by making each activ-
ity independent. Assumption 1 decreases the competition between countries to attract
MP which reduces the importance of the efficiency of multinationals operating in the
domestic country. Finally, even though with assumption 1 BMP is an important factor,
without assumption 1 BMP will be crucial for attracting MP, specially for small coun-
tries.
5.3 Firm size distribution
There is a large literature studying the effects of different kinds of friction on the size
distribution of firms. Previous studies have focused on the effects of size dependent
policies (Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-
Mas (2012)), capital market imperfections (Erosa (2001), Amaral and Quintin (2010),
Buera et al. (2011), Greenwood et al. (2010)) and trade (Melitz (2003), Piguillem and
Rubini (2012)) on firm size distribution. I contribute to this literature by assessing the
effect of trade and MP on the distribution of firms’ sizes and show that these effects vary
across small and large countries within a region, and also among countries of similar size
across regions with different degrees of openness.
Let us first study the total effect of trade and MP in the distribution of firm size.
In autarky all countries will have the same distribution of firms,28 while in the baseline
economy this distribution differs significantly across countries. In the baseline economy,
the small country in each region has a higher proportion of large firms than the large
country. In South America, Uruguay has 1.1% of firms with more than 250 employees
while Brazil has 0.8%, and in Europe this proportion is 4.2% for the Netherlands and
1.7% for Italy. It can also be observed that trade and MP has a larger impact on the size
distribution of firms for countries in Europe (the open region) than for countries in South
28This comes from the fact that I am using a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter for the
productivity of firms.
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America (the closed region). The proportion of firms with more than 250 employees is
almost four times larger in the Netherlands than in Uruguay (4.4% vs 1.1%), and in Italy
it doubles that of Brazil (1.7% vs 0.8%). As Europe is more open, they benefit more
from trade and MP and these shape the distribution of firms increasing the proportion
of large firms.
To disentangle the role played by trade and MP in shaping the size distribution of
firms, I compute the distribution of firm sizes in a world without MP. Comparing the
result of the column No MP to autarky we obtain the contribution of trade to the size
distribution of firms, and comparing the result of the column named baseline to the one
named No MP we obtain the contribution of MP.
For large countries, MP seems to be the most important factor. While the proportion
of large firms is almost unchanged when allowing for trade compared to autarky, it
increases significantly when we allow for MP. In Italy from the 1 percentage point increase
explained by openness, 0.2 p.p. is explained by trade while 0.8 p.p. is explained by MP.
For small countries this is not true. Both trade and MP have similar effects. In Uruguay
allowing for trade increases the proportion of large firms 0.2 p.p. and allowing for MP
increases the proportion 0.2 p.p. In the Netherlands, trade increases the proportion of
large firms by 1.3 p.p. and MP by 2.2 p.p.
To sum up, trade and MP have important effects on the size distribution of firms,
but this effect varies across countries and regions. Openness has a larger effect in the
size distribution of firms on countries in the open region and in small countries compared
to large countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I construct a heterogeneous firms model of trade with asymmetric countries,
MP, and BMP to study the effects of trade barriers and country size in the location
decision of multinational firms. I find that BMP is crucial for a small country to attract
MP and to take full advantage of trade liberalization and efficiency improvements. BMP
explains up to 20% of the gains from openness in the Netherlands while only 10% in
Uruguay.
If trade costs are reduced in South America to the average level in Europe, Uruguay’s
real manufacturing GDP increases 30%. If I do not allow for BMP this increase is
reduced by 6 percentage points. If in addition we improve the efficiency of multinationals
operating in Uruguay by 20%, real manufacturing GDP increases 41.8%. However,
almost all the additional increase in manufacturing real GDP is explained by BMP, since
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without BMP the increase is 26%, only 2.3 p.p. larger than without any improvement
in the efficiency of multinationals.
Finally, MP and BMP shift the distribution of firms toward large firms reinforcing
the effect of trade. While in autarky the Netherlands and Uruguay have the same
distribution of firms, in the calibrated version of the model, the Netherlands has a
proportion of firms with more than 100 employees which doubles that of Uruguay, and
with more than 250 employees which is four times larger.
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
Panel A
Li κ
e κd κx κMP z
Argentina 9.47 0.09 1.67 0.34 11.77 0.13
Brazil 48.94 1.95 1.67 1.15 2.07 0.35
Chile 3.69 0.13 1.67 2.05 19.07 0.04
Uruguay 1.00 0.07 1.67 0.82 9.17 0.01
Rest of the World 1582.5 3.00 1.67 1.00 2.67 12.66
Panel B
Li κ
e κd κx κMP z
France 16.8 3.3e-6 1.67 0.89 5.42 0.78
United Kingdom 18.7 3.0e-6 1.67 1.50 10.07 0.90
Italy 14.9 1.0e-6 1.67 1.25 9.87 0.73
Netherlands 4.9 1.0e-6 1.67 3.32 10.97 0.25
Rest of the World 1567.3 1.00 1.67 1.00 2.67 15.67
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Table 4: Calibration Results-Iceberg Export Costs
Panel A
Exporting country
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay RW
Argentina 1 2.27 2.73 2.39 2.61
Brazil 1.48 1 2.36 1.76 2.03
Chile 1.66 2.07 1 2.27 1.93
Uruguay 1.75 2.19 2.57 1 2.68
Rest of the World 1.74 1.97 2.06 2.22 1
Panel B
Exporting country
Country France UK Italy Netherlands RW
France 1 1.82 1.62 1.74 1.61
UK 1.59 1 1.70 1.50 1.36
Italy 1.80 1.94 1 1.74 1.81
Netherlands 1.52 1.49 1.55 1 1.32
Rest of the World 1.81 1.80 1.78 1.77 1
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Table 5: Calibration Results-Efficiency of Multinational Firms
Country of origin
Panel A
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay RW
Argentina 1 1.47 1.46 1.41 1.48
Brazil 3.75 1 3.08 2.45 2.49
Chile 2.49 2.35 1 2.15 1.81
Uruguay 100 100 100 1 2.02
Panel B
Country of origin
Country France UK Italy Netherlands RW
France 1 1.62 2.15 1.83 0.33
UK 1.65 1 2.20 1.68 0.28
Italy 1.40 1.49 1 1.55 0.29
Netherlands 1.65 1.47 100 1 0.29
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Table 6: Performance of the Model-Trade Composition
Trade (as % of Absorption)-Data vs Model
Panel A
Arg Bra Chi Uru RW
Data Model D M D M D M D M
Arg - - 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.8 9.5 9.8 0.2 0.2
Bra 9.6 9.1 - - 4.2 4.4 17.2 16.8 0.5 0.5
Chi 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.4 - - 1.8 1.5 0.2 0.1
Uru 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 - - 0.0 0.0
RW 24.0 24.2 18.9 18.9 51.3 51.5 29.9 30.1 - -
Total 35.8 35.1 22.8 23.2 59.4 60.1 58.3 58.2 0.9 0.9
Panel B
Fra UK Ita Neth RW
Data Model D M D M D M D M
Fra - - 8.5 6.3 8.6 7.5 13.8 11.2 2.3 1.7
UK 6.7 7.2 - - 4.4 5.1 18.6 18.9 2.6 2.8
Ita 7.6 7.2 5.0 4.3 - - 9.7 10.8 1.7 1.3
Neth 3.4 3.6 5.8 5.3 2.7 3.6 - - 1.2 1.2
RW 34.2 34.7 49.5 49.7 28.4 28.0 76.2 77.2 - -
Total 51.9 52.7 68.9 65.6 44.1 44.2 118.4 118.1 7.7 7.1
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Table 7: Performance of the Model-Foreign Production Composition
Foreign Sales (as % of Total Sales)-Data vs Model
Panel A
Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Argentina - - 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0%
Brazil 1.4% 1.5% - - 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0%
Chile 1.4% 1.4% 0.1% 0.1% - - 0.0% 0%
Uruguay 1.1% 1.0% 0.2% 0.2 % 0.3% 0.3% - -
RW 31.9% 31.7% 7.8% 8.0% 32.5% 32.3% 29.7% 30.7%
Panel B
Fra UK Ita Neth
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
France - - 2.5% 2.1% 2.5 % 2.6% 2.9% 2.6%
UK 3.0% 3.4% - - 1.6% 1.9% 4.9% 5.3%
Italy 1.6% 2.1% 1.2% 1.3% - - 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 1.4% 1.4% 2.1 % 1.6 % 1.3% 1.2 - -
RW 20.1% 20.3% 38.9% 37.8% 13.2% 12.7% 35.0% 35.1%
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Table 8: Calibration Results: Aggregate Targets
Panel A
Data vs Model
% Exporting Firms % Foreign Firms GDP per Capita Trade Balance
Data Model D M D M D M
Arg 52.3 52.4 7.9 7.9 1.56 1.56 -6.0 -6.1
Bra 14.1 14.1 7.2 6.9 0.87 0.86 -1.5 -1.8
Chi 24.6 24.3 5.8 5.8 1.08 1.08 -8.9 -8.8
Uru 33.3 32.8 7.7 8.0 1.22 1.24 -10.1 -9.9
Panel B
Data vs Model
% Exporting Firms % Foreign Firms GDP per Capita Trade Balance
Data Model D M D M D M
Fra 44.7 45.0 11.5 11.7 4.7 4.6 0.7 0.7
UK 37.0 36.7 12.6 12.8 4.6 4.6 -2.2 -2.4
Ita 28.4 28.9 3.6 3.9 5.5 5.5 8.9 9.5
Neth 42.2 42.5 12.9 12.5 5.0 5.0 -1.8 -1.6
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Table 9: Experiment Results-Closing the Economies
Panel A
Changes in %
Autarky with BMP Autarky without BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America -5.3 -3.4 -5.0 -3.5
Argentina -9.5 -4.9 -9.0 -5.2
Brazil -3.6 -2.5 -3.5 -2.5
Chile -11.9 -8.7 -10.9 -8.9
Uruguay -12.1 -10.8 -10.9 -10.4
Panel B
Changes in %
Autarky with BMP Autarky without BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
Europe -10.5 -7.3 -9.3 -7.3
France -9.1 -6.4 -8.3 -6.3
UK -13.4 -8.8 -11.9 -9.0
Italy -5.6 -3.5 -5.1 -3.6
Netherlands -20.3 -17.1 -17.0 -16.5
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Table 10: Experiment Results-The Effects of MP and BMP
Panel A
Relative losses in real GDP
Baseline
World without BMP
World without BMP
World without MP
Baseline
World without MP
Argentina 1.055 2.033 2.145
Brazil 1.035 1.510 1.563
Chile 1.099 1.478 1.623
Uruguay 1.112 1.510 1.680
Panel B
Relative losses in real GDP
Baseline
World without BMP
World without BMP
World without MP
Baseline
World without MP
France 1.087 1.679 1.826
UK 1.128 1.671 1.885
Italy 1.097 1.841 2.019
Netherlands 1.199 1.203 1.443
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Table 11: Experiment Results-Reducing Costs
Panel A
Changes (in %)
Same MP costs Same MP Costs-No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 6.2 6.1 5.3 6.0
Argentina 11.2 11.1 9.0 11.7
Brazil 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0
Chile 13.1 12.4 9.4 12.4
Uruguay 29.9 29.1 23.7 27.1
Panel B
Changes (in %)
Improve 20% efficiency Improve 20% efficiency- No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 9.7 6.6 7.6 6.9
Argentina 17.7 11.7 13.0 13.0
Brazil 6.3 4.3 5.6 4.5
Chile 21.4 14.3 12.4 14.3
Uruguay 38.3 36.6 24.4 30.7
Panel C
Changes (in %)
Improve 20% efficiency Improve 20% efficiency
only in Uruguay only in Uruguay- No BMP
Real GDP Real GNP Real GDP Real GNP
South-America 6.3 6.1 5.3 6.2
Argentina 11.1 11.1 9.0 11.7
Brazil 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0
Chile 13.1 12.4 9.4 12.4
Uruguay 41.8 29.3 26.0 28.1
For all the experiments I use the average trade costs in Europe (τ = 1.64)
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Table 12: Experiment Results-Firms Size Distribution
Panel A
Proportion of firms with more than x employees
Benchmark No BMP No MP Autarky
> 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250
Uruguay 3.4 1.1 3.2 1.0 2.9 0.9 2.2 0.7
Netherlands 7.9 4.2 7.5 3.7 5.6 2.0 2.2 0.7
Panel B
Proportion of firms with more than x employees
Benchmark No BMP No MP Autarky
> 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250 > 100 > 250
Brazil 2.4 0.8 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.8 2.2 0.7
Italy 3.5 1.7 3.5 1.6 2.8 0.9 2.2 0.7
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Figure 1: Average iceberg trade costs
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7 Appendix
7.1 Labor for the smaller firm operating
The amount of labor demanded by the smaller firm is:
`(φ∗iii) =
q(φ∗iii)
φ∗iii
+ κdi
q(φ∗iii) =
r(φ∗iii)
p(φ∗iii)
from equation (??) → r(φ∗iii) = σwiκdi
and from equation (6) → p(φ∗iii) =
σ
σ − 1
wi
φ∗iii
then → q(φ∗iii) = (σ − 1)κdi φ∗iii
`(φ∗iii) = σκ
d
i
7.2 Aggregation
In this section I will show how to get the weighted average productivity of firms produc-
ing and selling in each country, as well as the aggregate price and production.
From equation 24 we obtain the total mass of firms producing and the total mass
of firms selling in country i. Let us define the average productivity of firms performing
each activity:
φ˜iii =
[∫ ∞
φ∗iii
φσ−1µidφ
] 1
1−σ
φ˜kii =
[∫ ∞
φ∗kii
φσ−1µidφ
] 1
1−σ
φ˜kki =
[∫ ∞
φ∗kki
φσ−1µidφ
] 1
1−σ
φ˜jki =
[∫ ∞
φ∗jki
φσ−1µidφ
] 1
1−σ
Using the expressions from above we can define the weighted average productivity
as:
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φ˜pi =
{
1
Mpi
[
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
∑
k 6=i
Mkii
E1k
E1i
(
Pk
τkiPi
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1kii +
∑
k 6=i
Miik
(
1
γik
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1iik
+
∑
k 6=i
∑
i 6=j
Mkij
E1k
E1i
(
Pk
τkiγij
)σ−1
φ˜σ−1kij
]} 1σ−1
, (32)
φ˜si =
{
1
M si
[
Miiiφ˜
σ−1
iii +
∑
k 6=i
Mikk
(
wkτik
wi
)1−σ
φ˜σ−1ikk +
∑
k 6=i
Miikγ
1−σ
ik φ˜
σ−1
iik
+
∑
k 6=i
∑
i 6=j
Mijk
(
τijγjkwk
wi
)1−σ
φ˜σ−1ijk
]} 1σ−1
. (33)
Let us write now the equation for aggregate price in country i (equation 22)
Pi =
[∫
φ∗iii
(piii(φ))
1−σMiµi(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikk
(pikk(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ (34)
+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
(piik(φ))
1−σMkµk(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikj
(pikj(φ))
1−σMjµj(φ)dφ
] 1
1−σ
.
now, replace pikj(φ) ∀i, j, k using equation 6 in the previous expression to obtain:
Pi =
[∫
φ∗iii
(
wi
ρφ
)1−σ
Miµi(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikk
(
wkτik
ρφ
)1−σ
Mkµk(φ)dφ
+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
(
wiγik
ρφ
)1−σ
Mkµk(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗ikj
(
wkγkjτik
ρφ
)1−σ
Mjµj(φ)dφ
] 1
1−σ
Pi =
[(
wi
ρ
)1−σ
Mi
∫
φ∗iii
(φ)σ−1 µi(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=i
Mikk
(
wkτik
ρ
)1−σ ∫
φ∗ikk
(φ)σ−1 µk(φ)dφ
+
∑
k 6=i
Miik
(
wiγik
ρ
)1−σ ∫
φ∗iik
(φ)σ−1 µk(φ)dφ+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
Mikj
(
wkγkjτik
ρ
)1−σ ∫
φ∗ikj
(φ)σ−1 µj(φ)dφ
] 1
1−σ
We can replace the integral terms by each of the average productivities, and we get:
Pi =
wi
ρ
[
Miiiφ˜
1−σ
iii +
∑
k 6=i
Mikk
(
wkτik
wi
)1−σ
φ˜1−σikk
+
∑
k 6=i
Miikγ
1−σ
ik φ˜
1−σ
iik +
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
Mikj
(
wkγkjτik
wi
)1−σ
φ˜1−σikj
] 1
1−σ
Note that the term inside brackets is
(Msi )
1
σ−1
φ˜si
, and that p(φ˜si ) =
wi
ρφ˜si
. Then
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P = (M si )
1
1−σ p(φ˜si )
In a similar way we can derive the equation for aggregate GDP.
GDPi =
∫
φ∗iii
riii(φ)Miµidφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kii
rkii(φ)Miµidφ
+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
riik(φ)Mkµkdφ+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kij
rkij(φ)Mjµjdφ
Replacing r(φ) by the expressions found in equation 7 we get:
GDPi =
∫
φ∗iii
E1i P
σ−1
i
(
ρφ
wi
)σ−1
Miµidφ+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kii
E1kP
σ−1
k
(
ρφ
wiτki
)σ−1
Miµidφ
+
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗iik
E1i P
σ−1
i
(
ρφ
wiγik
)σ−1
Mkµkdφ
+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
∫
φ∗kij
E1kP
σ−1
k
(
ρφ
wiγijτki
)σ−1
Mjµjdφ
GDPi = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
(
ρ
wi
)σ−1
Mi
∫
φ∗iii
φσ−1µidφ+
∑
k 6=i
E1kP
σ−1
k
(
ρ
wiτki
)σ−1
Mi
∫
φ∗kii
φσ−1µidφ
+
∑
k 6=i
E1i P
σ−1
i
(
ρ
wiγik
)σ−1
Mk
∫
φ∗iik
φσ−1µkdφ
+
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
E1kP
σ−1
k
(
ρ
wiγijτki
)σ−1
Mj
∫
φ∗kij
φσ−1µjdφ
We can replace again the integral terms by the average productivities for each occu-
pation, and operating we get:
GDPi = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
(
ρ
wi
)σ−1 [
Miφ˜
1−σ
iii +
∑
k 6=i
E1k
E1i
(
Pk
Piwiτki
)σ−1
Mkiiφ˜
1−σ
kii
+
∑
k 6=i
(
1
γik
)σ−1
Miikφ˜
1−σ
iik
∑
k 6=j
∑
k 6=i
E1k
E1i
(
Pk
Piγijτki
)σ−1
Mjφ˜
1−σ
kij
]
Note that the term in brackets is equal to Mpi ∗
(
φ˜pi
)σ−1
, then
GDPi = M
p
i E
1
i P
σ−1
i
(
ρ
wi
)σ−1 (
φ˜pi
)σ−1
and as riii(φ˜
p
i ) = E
1
i P
σ−1
i
(
ρφ˜pi
wi
)σ−1
then
GDPi = M
p
i riii(φ˜
p
i )
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7.3 Algorithm to solve for the equilibrium
In order to solve for the equilibrium we need to give 3∗N guesses. We will give N guesses
for the product of expenditure in differentiated goods and aggregate prices (E1i ∗P σ−1i ),
N guesses for wages (wi) and N guesses for the mass of firms in country i (Mi). With
these guesses we can calculate the productivity cut-offs for each activity using equation
8, 11, and 14. Once we have all the cut-offs computed we need to follow the next steps
for each country. Take country i:
1. Check if the exporting cut-offs (φ∗jii), MP cut-offs (φ
∗
kki) and the BMP cut-offs
(φ∗jki) are well computed.
(a) If all the cut-offs for firms from country i producing in country k and selling
to country j are bigger than the domestic cut-offs, then the domestic cut-offs
are well computed and you have to go to step 2.
(b) If at least one cut-off is smaller than the domestic cut-off:
• If the smallest cut-off is an exporting or a MP cut-off, then:
i. Re-calculated the domestic cut-off cut-off using equation 13.
ii. Check that the new domestic cut-off is smaller than the rest of cut-offs
(exporting, MP or BMP) or repeat the previous step incorporating the
new smallest cut-off until there are no more cut-offs smaller than the
domestic cut-off.
• If the smallest cut-off is a BMP cut-off, then
i. First re-calculated the new MP cut-off using equation 15.
ii. If this new MP cut-off is above the domestic cut-off, then check if there
are no more cut-offs smaller than the domestic one. If this is the case,
go to step 2.
iii. If this new MP cut-off is smaller than the domestic cut-off re-calculate
the domestic cut-off using equation 35 and repeat the process until there
are no more cut-offs smaller than the domestic one.
piiii(φ
∗
iii)+
∑
k∈Kx
pikii(φ
∗
iii)+
∑
k∈KMPki
pikki(φ
∗
iii)+
∑
k 6=i
∑
j∈JBMPki
pijki(φ
∗
iii) = 0 , (35)
2. Check that the MP cut-offs are well computed i.e. that all the BMP cut-offs are
larger or equal than the MP cut-off in each case.
(a) If all the BMP cut-off are above the MP cut-off, then the MP cut-off is well
computed and we are done.
(b) If at least one BMP cut-off is smaller than the MP cut-off, re-calculate the
MP cut-off using equation 15.
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(c) Repeat the process until there are no more BMP cut-offs smaller than the MP
cut-off
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